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ON THE CONTENT AND 
CHARACTER OF PAIN EXPERIENCE 
 
 
BY 
 
RICHARD GRAY 
  
 
 
Abstract: Tracking representationalism explains the negative 
affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by 
reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily 
damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the 
tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – 
and use this to motivate a non-reductive approach to the negative 
affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is 
supported by consideration of three related topics: the pain caused 
when the body is damaged, reparative pain, and the messenger-
shooting objection to tracking representationalism. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Pain experiences differ from paradigmatic perceptual experiences in two 
main ways, or so it is generally held: pain experiences have a distinctive 
negative affective character that is lacking in paradigmatic perceptual 
experiences and pain experiences motivate our actions directly in a way 
that paradigmatic perceptual experiences do not. Advocates of 
representationalism have recently sought to address both features of 
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pain experience at a single stroke by supplementing the contents that 
are represented by pain experience.1 As Cutter & Tye put it: ‘our pain 
experiences do not just represent the presence of tissue damage, but also 
(roughly) represent our tissue damage as bad for us to some degree’.2 
The idea is that the representation of valuational properties explains 
both the negative affective character of pain and the motivation we have 
for responding to pain.3 
Here I endorse a representationalist approach to pain experience, 
but with two significant modifications to the version advocated by Cutter 
& Tye, and others. First, I raise doubts about bodily damage, or any 
other property of the body, being the appropriate non-valuational 
content of pain experience, at least for a substantial proportion of pain 
experiences. Second, I argue that the explanation of the abovementioned 
features of pain requires a non-reductive approach to pain. The first 
point of disagreement paves the way for the second point of 
disagreement, and the motivation for the former lies in a key feature of 
Cutter & Tye’s own account: their theory of content determination.4 
Tracking representationalism combines a thesis about the 
character of experience – that it supervenes on the content of experience 
– with a thesis about the content of experience – that it is determined by 
a tracking relation. Token experiences, according to Cutter & Tye, are 
token neural states. They are tokens of a type of experience in virtue of 
instantiating the following tracking theory of intentionality: 
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Tracking Theory of Intentionality (TTI): Tokens of a state S in an individual x 
represent that p in virtue of the fact that: under optimal conditions, x tokens S 
iff p, and because p.5 
 
In the case of a paradigmatic perceptual experience, such as a visual 
experience, optimal conditions are those that ‘the visual system was 
designed to operate in by natural selection or by some analogous process 
in the course of ontogenic development’. They maintain that the same 
applies to other modes of perception, and also to pain experience. 
They ask their readers to consider a pain in the forearm. They 
state that ‘[u]nder normal conditions, experiences of this type are caused 
by the presence of damage or disturbance of tissue in a forearm’.6 They 
reason that ‘tissue damage or disturbance is what pain experiences 
track, so it follows from TTI that this is what pain experiences 
represent’.7 The main problem for their account, as they see it, is that it 
may seem unable to explain the negative affective character of pain. For 
the representational content seems to be exhausted by ‘the location and 
physiological properties of some tissue damage or disturbance’, given 
that it is only these properties that seem to be causally relevant to the 
instantiation of tokens of state S in an individual. Their response is to 
supplement the contents of pain experience with valuational properties: 
pain experiences do not just represent the location and physiological 
properties of tissue damage or disturbance but also the tissue damage or 
disturbance as bad for us to some degree. Valuational properties can be 
and are represented by pain experience, in their view, in so far as brain 
states are causally sensitive to them. Valuational properties are 
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properties to which we are causally sensitive because it is plausible to 
think that, necessarily, some property is bad for us if and only if it is apt 
to harm us, and the property of being apt to harm us is something to 
which we can be causally sensitive.8 It is the representation of bodily 
damage or disturbance as bad for us that is claimed to explain the 
motivational capacity of pain. 
In the following I contest Cutter & Tye’s application of TTI. I 
focus on two respects in which its application challenges their own view 
of the non-valuational content of pain experience. This provides reason 
to re-assess the explanation given of the negative affective character of 
pain in terms of the valuational content of pain experience, and, 
therefore, of the related representationalist explanation of the 
motivational capacity of pain.  
In §2, I argue that for a significant class of pain experiences, TTI 
is instantiated not by bodily damage, nor by any other property of the 
body, but by the extreme intensity of stimuli impinging on the body. In 
these cases, pain experience has an exteroceptive role: to determine the 
extreme intensity of stimuli impinging on the body. Given that pains are 
standardly taken to be located in the body, and thus interoceptive, the 
exteroceptive role of pain may be counter-intuitive and of note in itself. 
But it is not so much this that is an issue for a representationalist 
approach. Indeed, if it is right that the best way in which to explain pain 
experiences, at least in many cases, is by distinguishing between 
exteroceptive and interoceptive experiences, this would provide further 
reason to endorse a representationalist approach. Rather, the 
exteroceptive role of pain raises the question, in a particularly vivid way, 
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of how the additional representation of valuational properties can 
explain the negative affective character of pain. A reductive explanation 
of the negative affective character would account for it fully by reference 
to the badness for us of the extreme intensity of stimuli impinging on the 
body, which would, in turn, be explained by natural properties of the 
extremely intense stimuli, such as their aptness to harm us. But, as §3 
argues, such properties are implausible candidates for adequately 
explaining the qualitative properties of pain experiences. Hence there is 
reason to endorse a contrary position: the irreducibility of the negative 
affective character of pain experience to the content represented by the 
experience. According to this position, the negative affective character of 
pain experience constitutes a phenomenal mode of presentation of the 
valuational content. The question remains of why the badness for us of 
the extreme intensity of stimuli should be presented in this way: why 
should the representation of the badness for us of the extreme intensity 
of noxious stimuli feel bad? The answer proposed here is likewise non-
reductive. Pain feels bad because it realizes twin functions: it represents 
the badness for us of the extreme intensity of stimuli and it motivates a 
response to it. 
The second issue that the application of TTI raises concerns the 
optimal conditions condition. It is uncontroversial that pain experience 
is also related to bodily damage. After all, bodily damage typically causes 
pain. So the question arises of how the pain experience that follows 
bodily damage is related to the pain experience that determines the 
presence of noxious stimuli. Given that, typically, bodily damage is at 
odds with the presence of optimal conditions for bodily function, there is 
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a tension between the representation of bodily damage and 
misrepresentation caused by bodily damage. The tension has been 
overlooked in the recent literature and is addressed in §4. Even if some 
of the pain following bodily damage can be regarded as 
misrepresentational, it is implausible that all of it can be so regarded. 
Reparative pain plays a vital role in recovery from injury. §5 shows how 
much of the reparative pain associated with bodily damage can also best 
be understood as the representation of the badness for us of the extreme 
intensity of stimuli impinging on the body. §6 concludes by bringing 
together the results of preceding sections to provide a novel response to 
a problem that has already received a good deal of coverage in the recent 
literature: the messenger-shooting objection to representationalism.  
 
 
2. The Exteroceptive Role of Pain 
 
When Cutter & Tye write that the content of pain experience is ‘damage 
or disturbance’, and thus the object of a form of interoception, they are 
not endorsing the claim that pain experience represents a disjunction of 
contents. Rather they are tacitly acknowledging that they are not quite 
sure about the exact property of the body that is represented by pain 
experience.9 For TTI to provide the content of an experience, there must 
be one and only one property that causally co-varies with a type of 
experiential state under optimal conditions. Tye is explicit about the 
restriction on content in earlier work: although S may be tokened if and 
only if either of two properties is tokened, S can only be tokened either 
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because one disjunct is tokened or because the other disjunct is tokened; 
it cannot be tokened because the disjunction is tokened, since it is the 
distinct properties that are causally efficacious not their disjunction.10  
There is a further reason why a disjunction of contents has to be rejected 
by Tye. As he is also committed to the claim that the character of an 
experience can be reductively explained by the content represented by 
an experience, two different and equally deserving candidate properties 
for the representational content of one type of experience would 
challenge that claim. The restriction on content is significant in the 
present context because there is another candidate for the content of 
pain experience that instantiates TTI.  
Consider again their example of the pain in a forearm. What they 
do not mention, and they are far from alone in this, is the way in which 
pain, such as a pain in the forearm, is caused before the body is 
damaged. Consider a case in which a candle is held up to your forearm. 
After a while it will cause a pain in your forearm. But exactly what does 
the pain experience represent? Tye and Cutter, and many others, will 
presumably say that it represents disturbance (or damage) in the 
forearm. Perhaps that is how the pain experience seems to most people. 
Perhaps that is because most people think of the pain that is caused by 
damage to the body when they first think of pain. But there is another 
cause. Furthermore, it is a less problematic instantiation of TTI than 
damage or disturbance. 
Pain experience is typically caused when nociceptors are 
activated. Nociceptors are sensory receptors that are responsive to 
stimuli of a greater energy than that to which the sensory receptors of 
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the paradigmatic perceptual modalities are sensitive.11 The activation of 
nociceptors by such stimuli enables the extraction of information from 
the stimuli by transduction. In the case of the present example, 
transduction comes about when thermal stimuli of greater intensity than 
those which are detected by thermal perception impinge on the body 
and activate the nociceptors in the forearm causing the transmission of 
electrical signals. There is no reason to think that optimal conditions are 
not met. Given that, under optimal conditions, an individual tokens pain 
experiences of such a type if and only if extremely intense (thermal) 
stimuli impinge on the body and because they impinge on the body, 
according to TTI, a pain experience like the present example represents 
that there is something extremely intense impinging on the forearm.12  
That pain is, at least in some cases, an exteroceptive experience of 
the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli impinging on the body might 
seem counterintuitive given that pains are usually taken to be located 
inside the body. Indeed, Grice rejects the possibility that pain experience 
is akin to the experiences of the paradigmatic exteroceptive senses; he 
points out that pains are not greatly variegated and many types of object 
can inflict pain in a variety of ways.13 Hence the standard perceptualist 
view is that pain is interoceptive. Let me emphasize that I am not 
challenging Grice’s rejection of that exteroceptive view here. I claim that 
pain experiences, at least in many cases, determine the extreme intensity 
of noxious stimuli that impinge on the body from outside it.14 
An exteroceptive experience of this sort is not inconsistent with 
the phenomenology of pain. Pain experience of the kind exemplified 
here is related to tactile and thermal experiences, which, it is plausible to 
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think, are exteroceptive experiences of properties of stimuli impinging 
on the body. When one first feels the thermal stimuli emitted by the 
candle impinging on the body one experiences a sensation of heat. 
Exactly what one experiences is a tricky issue. But it is plausible to think 
that it is something outside the body impinging on the body.15 The 
phenomenal character of the experience is consistent with this. When 
the thermal stimuli get more intense another type of experience 
individuated by its distinctive negative affective character will occur. It 
may not be clear whether the heat sensation is supplemented by a pain 
experience or whether the heat sensation is replaced by a pain 
experience. If the latter, it may be vague where the boundary between an 
intense heat sensation and a pain sensation lies.16 Still, it would be hard 
to deny that when the stimuli are sufficiently intense a pain experience 
will be present that has a determinate negative affective character.  And 
the pain experience will disappear when the stimuli are no longer 
present. There is nothing in the phenomenal character of the pain 
experience itself to suggest that one’s experience changes from being of 
something outside the body’s boundaries impinging on the body to 
something inside the body’s boundaries. The quality of the experience is 
different from the earlier heat sensation, but there has been no apparent 
change in the location of what is experienced. Something similar applies 
in the case of pressure experience. When someone squeezes your 
forearm you at first feel the pressure on your forearm. It is plausible to 
think that what you experience is as of something outside the body 
impinging on the body. When the pressure gets more intense, there is 
nothing in the phenomenal character of the subsequent pain experience 
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to suggest that your pain experience is then as of something inside the 
body’s boundaries.  
Could it be that the pain experience represents tissue disturbance 
because the nociceptors respond to a change generated in the body’s 
tissue by the stimuli? One might assume so. However, given that there is 
an appropriate distal cause, it is not clear that this would show that it is 
not the extreme intensity of the stimuli impinging on the body that is 
detected. Anyway, and more importantly, empirical evidence indicates 
that nociceptors respond directly to the noxious stimuli.17 
Could it be that pain experience represents the activation of the 
nociceptors? That also causally covaries with pain experience. Again, a 
reason would have to be given for why it should be the proximal cause of 
pain experiences that is represented when there are appropriate distal 
causes. But there is a more significant reason for a representationalist to 
reject such a candidate for content in the present context. Even if pain 
experience represented some state of the body, even some disturbance of 
the body, by representing the activation of nociceptors, it is hard to see 
what negative valuational property would be represented. After all, it is 
the activation of nociceptors that protects us from the noxious stimuli 
caused by things such as candles. 
Tracking representationalists should accept the upshot of the 
application of TTI that some pain is exteroceptive. It is not only 
consistent with their general approach to pain experience but a more 
accurate realization of it. An instantiation is provided for the non-
valuational content of pain: the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli. It 
is plausible to think that such a property of stimuli can cause the brain 
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to token a state, S. And it also allows for a valuational property: the 
badness of the extreme intensity of such stimuli for one. Indeed, here it 
is a straightforward matter to identify the valuational property: the 
extreme intensity of stimuli is, additionally, bad for one to a certain 
degree because, if one does not remove the stimuli, they are apt to 
damage one’s body to a certain degree. And it is plausible to think that 
we are causally sensitive to the badness of such stimuli because noxious 
stimuli cause us to respond to them in a way that we do not respond to 
stimuli that are not bad for us. 
Moreover, there are a priori reasons to prefer such a view. Pain 
experience would be of more benefit were it an experience of the 
extreme intensity of noxious stimuli when effective pre-emptive action 
can be taken, than if it were an experience of a part of the body that is 
already in a bad state when only limited remedial action is possible. And 
it would be to our advantage were nociceptors sufficiently sensitive to 
noxious stimuli impinging on the body that they enable a direct response 
to their presence.18 
Objections might still be raised. It might be argued that a reflex 
better explains this kind of example. And it might be argued that as far 
as protection from noxious stimuli is concerned pain experience is not a 
very efficient mechanism.19 No doubt both objections carry some weight. 
There is a quick neural pathway, which enables the prevention of 
damage, that does not involve the presence of pain experiences when 
stimuli are sufficiently intense. And no such pain experience will prevent 
some kinds of bodily damage. Nevertheless, there are all manner of 
stimuli that are bad for us that are not like these.20 They occur at the 
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limits of sensitivity of our paradigmatic sensory systems. Given that our 
sensory systems have evolved to detect variations in the intensity of 
stimuli, it should not be a puzzle as to how and why we should be 
sensitive to the intensity of stimuli that can be sufficiently intense as to 
be bad for us. 
None of the above is supposed to suggest that the exteroceptive 
role of pain is the only role of pain. Not all pain is exogenous (caused 
from outside the body); some pain is endogenous (caused from inside 
the body). But now the exteroceptive role of pain points to a rather 
different interpretation of the interoceptive role for pain than the usual 
one of representing a part of the body that is in a damaged or disturbed 
state. When pain is interoceptive, at least in many cases, it is plausible to 
think that it is also an experience of the extreme intensity of noxious 
stimuli. Imagine a time when you were sitting in an awkward posture. 
Just as we are aware of the position of parts of the body by detecting 
muscle, tendon and joint movement through proprioception, so we are 
aware of when one part of the body exerts too much pressure on another 
part of the body through nociception. But we should not think of this as 
an interoceptive experience of a part of the body that is in a bad state. 
That is because pain is not caused by a part of the body that is in a bad 
state. When one part of the body places extreme pressure on another 
part of the body, pain is caused by the extremely intense pressure of the 
impinging part of the body. The disturbed part of the body may cause 
pain but not because it is a disturbed part of the body; rather it brings 
about extremely intense pressure that comes to bear on the impinging 
part of the body. Given that, under optimal conditions, individuals token 
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such pain experiences if and only if extremely intense (pressure) stimuli 
impinge on a part of the body and because they impinge on a part of the 
body, according to TTI, such pain experiences represent that there is 
something extremely intense impinging on a part of the body from 
within the body.21 
The distinction between exogenous and endogenous pain should 
not be controversial. What may be controversial is the claim that the 
distinction is relevant for a theory of pain. But there is a reason to think 
it is relevant. Protection of the body, to which few would dispute that 
pain experience contributes, requires protection from something. By 
distinguishing between exteroceptive and interoceptive pain 
experiences, a straightforward explanation can be given for why we 
respond to noxious stimuli impinging on the body from outside it in a 
way that is different from the way we respond to noxious stimuli 
impinging on the body from inside it: the respective experiences 
represent the different origins of their causes. The distinction is 
significant in the present context because it provides further support for 
a representationalist approach to pain experience.  
There is another reason why the content just motivated is 
significant for the representationalist case. It has been claimed that the 
apparent heterogeneity of pain’s causes is hard to square with the 
commonality of pain experiences. For instance, Klein supports his view 
that pain experience is solely constituted by imperative content 
(commands to protect the body by acting in a certain way) by reference 
to the commonality of pain experiences, which, so he claims, cannot be 
explained by a representationalist approach due to the diversity of pain’s 
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causes.22 The challenge warrants a response. On the present approach, 
representational content is not as diverse as it might appear: pain 
experiences tend to be caused by the extreme intensity of noxious 
stimuli. 
In sum, it is the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli that is, in 
normal circumstances, the necessary and sufficient cause of pain 
experiences.23 As will be discussed further in §§4-5 respectively, bodily 
damage is neither necessary nor sufficient for pain experience. However, 
sense can also be made of those pain experiences that follow bodily 
damage by reference to the pain caused by noxious stimuli. 
Nevertheless, one respect in which the exteroceptive role of pain raises a 
question to the representationalist approach needs to be considered 
first. 
 
 
3. Content, Character and Motivation 
 
The previous section argued for a reassessment of the non-valuational 
content of pain experience, or at least of a large class of pain 
experiences. Representationalists are attentive to the content of 
experience for what it can tell us about the character of experience, 
which, it is minimally claimed, supervenes on the content of experience. 
So, the question arises: if pain experience represents the badness for us 
of extremely intense stimuli, what implications does this have for the 
account one gives of the character of pain experience? 
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Given the non-standard nature of the present account, it would 
seem that the non-valuational content identified here is not evident in 
the phenomenal character of pain experience. One explanation for this 
may be that, in normal circumstances, as soon as stimuli of a sufficiently 
great intensity impinge on the body, one experiences the negative 
affective character of pain. That is to say, as soon as the extreme 
intensity of stimuli impinging on the body is detected, it is represented 
as bad for us. This suggests two possibilities regarding the way in which 
the representation of the extreme intensity of stimuli is manifested in 
the character of experience: (1) the extreme intensity of stimuli is 
represented in pain experience but obscured by the representation of its 
badness for us, or (2) the extreme intensity of stimuli is not in itself 
represented in experience but is represented in virtue of the 
representation of the badness for us of the extreme intensity of stimuli. 
There is some support for the view that both components of 
content constitute pain experience. It is held by representationalists, and 
others, that morphine cases and asymbolia are best explained by the 
dissociation of two components of pain experience: a proprietary 
sensory component and an affective component.24 On the approach 
proposed here, the proprietary sensory component would not be what it 
is usually thought to be; it would not be of bodily damage or disturbance 
but of the extreme intensity of stimuli. Nevertheless, the sensory and 
affective components of pain experience could dissociate if the extreme 
intensity of noxious stimuli could be represented without the 
representation of its badness for one. Such experiences would plausibly 
be characterized by their greater intensity than that of normal 
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perceptual experiences of the intensity of stimuli.  However, the present 
account would not be undermined if the sensory and affective elements 
do not, or could not, dissociate, or, as some accounts have held, there is 
no proprietary sensory component to pain experience.25 In that case, the 
negative affective character of pain would represent the extreme 
intensity of stimuli in virtue of representing the badness for one of the 
extreme intensity of noxious stimuli.26 
In neither case would it be the representation of the extreme 
intensity of stimuli impinging on the body that explains the negative 
affective character of pain on the present account. This, in common with 
other representationalist accounts, is explained by the representation of 
the badness for one of the non-valuational content. Nevertheless, the 
reassessment of the non-valuational content gives rise to some 
consequences for how one explains the negative affective character of 
pain. It raises the question, in a particularly vivid way, of how the 
additional representation of valuational properties can explain the 
negative affective character of pain. 
Cutter & Tye spend some time defending the claim that a 
valuational property can be represented against objections that it cannot 
instantiate the relevant causal relation with a specific type of state, S. 
The modification of the non-valuational content advocated here 
supports them. The badness for one of the extreme intensity of stimuli 
impinging on a part of the body has the relevant causal relation with a 
specific type of state, S, because brain states that respond to the extreme 
intensity of stimuli, do so not just because of the intensity of stimuli but 
because their intensity is bad for us.27 However, there is a more serious 
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challenge that they do not address: how the badness for us of the 
extreme intensity of stimuli can have the requisite nature to constitute 
the character of an experience of it. 
The existing exemplars for how to think of the constitution of the 
character of experience by the content of experience are to be found in 
paradigmatic perceptual experiences where content is a categorical 
physical property of things. Tye is well known for advocating a reductive 
explanation of phenomenal character. And it is such an explanation that 
seems to be assumed by Cutter & Tye in their account of the negative 
affective character of pain.  But, in the case of pain experience, although 
its content – the aptness to harm of extremely intense stimuli – is, 
arguably, a natural property of things, it is hard to see how a 
dispositional property is the right kind of property to constitute the 
character of experience of it. After all, how can a mere disposition to 
have a certain effect have the appropriate qualitative nature to explain 
the character of experience? To compound matters, the dispositional 
property is also relational: the extreme intensity of stimuli has an 
aptness to harm because of the physical nature of our bodies.  It is even 
harder to see how a dispositional property that is relational could be the 
right kind of property to constitute the character of experience of pain. 
The difficulty does not arise for a contrary non-reductive 
representationalist explanation of phenomenal character, according to 
which phenomenal character is not explained by a property represented 
by experience but by a property of experience. Indeed, it is quite natural. 
The property of experience that constitutes the character of pain 
experience enables pain to pick out the property that causes it when TTI 
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is instantiated. That is to say, it constitutes the phenomenal mode of 
presentation of the badness of the extreme intensity of stimuli 
impinging on the body. Non-reductive representationalism is a form of 
representationalism because it accepts that pain experience has 
correctness conditions.28 Pain experience is veridical, under normal 
cicumstances, iff there is something extremely intense impinging on the 
body.  
A non-reductive approach is also able to address a further issue. 
The preceding explanation of the character of pain experience does not 
explain why pain has its distinctive negative affective character, rather 
than some other character. It does not explain why the representation of 
the badness of something for us should feel bad to us. But only a minor 
modification to the proposal is required to address the issue. Pain 
experience has multiple functions: pain not only has the function of 
representing the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli; it also has 
the function of providing the motivation for a response to the stimuli 
that are bad for us.  
Representationalists claim that pain experiences are motivational 
in virtue of the content that is represented by pain experience. For Bain, 
the claim seems ‘utterly natural: when the badness for you of a state of 
the body is impressed on you, this – independently of further desires – 
defeasibly motivates you to do something about that bodily state’.29 The 
onus, he claims, is on those who deny this by maintaining ‘broad 
inertness’ to make the case for it. No doubt there is something plausible 
about the motivational power of a belief that one’s body is in a certain 
state when it is impressed on us independently of further desires. But 
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that is because it is the content of the belief that provides the motivation. 
And such contents are, plausibly, transparent to us when we have such 
beliefs.30 But it is far from clear that we are aware of such contents when 
we have a pain experience. Indeed, the fact that a case can be made for a 
different content of pain experience suggests that such content is not 
impressed on us as the content that it is.31 
The conclusion should not be drawn that pain experience does 
not have the content proposed here. After all, TTI gives us reason to 
think that it does. The conclusion should rather be drawn that the 
content of pain does not strike us as the content that it is: the badness 
for us of extremely intense stimuli. Therefore, it is not our grasp of the 
representational content that motivates a response to pain. A different 
explanation is, nevertheless, available. 
Reductive representationalists seek to explain fully the negative 
affective character of pain and the motivational capacity of pain by 
reference to non-phenomenal features.32 The present approach eschews 
this with respect to the explanatory relationship between character and 
content. The difficulties with explaining the motivational capacity of 
pain experience by reference to representational content suggests that a 
non-reductive approach should also be considered with respect to the 
explanatory relationship between character, content and motivation. In 
order to explain the motivational capacity of pain we should not expect a 
full explanation by reference to natural features underlying pain 
experience; we should seek an explanation for the motivational capacity 
of pain, and thereby of the negative affective character of pain, by 
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reference to how the negative affective character of pain itself motivates 
our action. 
The reassessment of the content of pain experience makes 
available a straightforward explanation of its character in this way: pain 
has its distinctive negative affective character in order to motivate the 
effects that it enables towards such content. The negative affective 
character of pain, under optimal conditions, constitutes not only the 
mode of presentation of the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli, it also 
provides the motivation for their removal by providing the motivation 
for its own elimination, which is, under normal circumstances, best 
achieved by the removal of the stimuli that cause it. On this approach, 
contrary to popular philosophical opinion, the negative affective 
character of pain experience can be explained by reference to its 
function.33  
Consider the pain experience that is, under optimal conditions, 
caused if and only if there is heat of an extreme intensity impinging on 
the forearm. In having its negative affective character, the pain 
experience represents the badness of the extremely intense thermal 
stimuli. But the negative affective character of pain is also irreducibly 
and non-instrumentally bad for one in so far as it feels bad for one. The 
negative affective character of the pain is thus such that, under normal 
circumstances, its elimination is an end that is sought in itself. Under 
normal circumstances, pain experiences of this type are most effectively 
eliminated by removing the noxious stimuli that cause them. In this way 
nature has found a means by which we can respond to noxious stimuli 
impinging on the body. The negative affective character of pain is 
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essential to the protective role of pain: it is because pain feels bad that it 
is instrumentally good. But, as will become clear, this is only so because 
optimal conditions pertain.  
 
 
4. Nociception and Bodily Damage 
 
If the candle is left under the forearm too long, its heat will damage the 
forearm. Pain is also caused by tissue damage. It is for this reason that 
nociception is often taken to be the sensory system that determines the 
presence of damage to the body. And it is for this reason that bodily 
damage is standardly cited as one of the main candidates for the content 
of pain experience. However, contrary to what Cutter & Tye claim, it is 
not the case that the pain experience caused when the body has been 
damaged instantiates TTI. Pain experience is present after the candle 
has been removed because the forearm has been damaged. And damage 
to a part of the body is often sufficient for a pain experience to occur. But 
damage to the body is not necessary for pain experience. As just 
explained, pain experience typically occurs when noxious stimuli 
impinge on the body without damaging the body. 
In order to maintain their view that pain experiences represent 
the presence of tissue damage, Tye would have to show that bodily 
damage is necessary for pain experience. Perhaps a clue is to be found in 
the need, already remarked on, to reject a disjunction of properties as 
the representational content of pain experience. The response 
sometimes canvassed when the problem of multiple contents for pain is 
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raised, which would also address the apparent non-necessity of bodily 
damage for pain experience, is to posit a more general cause of pain that 
includes its various causes. No such content has been met with general 
approval. And the task of finding an appropriate general content is now 
made all the more difficult by the presence of two such different causes 
of pain: noxious stimuli and bodily damage. 
But, even if a response along the above lines was tenable, there is 
a further problem. In order for TTI to be instantiated, optimal 
conditions must obtain. And there are reasons to doubt that optimal 
conditions obtain in the case of the pain experience that is caused by 
bodily damage. 
Roughly speaking, optimal conditions obtain in the case of 
perceptual experiences of the paradigmatic perceptual modalities when 
receptors dedicated to the detection of stimuli that mediate the 
perception of specific kinds of object are stimulated by those stimuli 
when they are caused by the appropriate objects. Optimal conditions are 
likewise in place in the case of nociception when nociceptors are 
stimulated by the extreme intensity of stimuli that are bad for us. 
However, matters are rather more complex in the case of the pain 
experience that arises when the body has been damaged. Indeed, there is 
a different way in which nociceptors are activated when the body is 
damaged that is not only at odds with the mechanisms of paradigmatic 
perceptual processes but that also normally undermines the success of 
such perceptual processes. 
When the body is damaged, nociceptors also tend to be damaged. 
Pain experience is not only caused by the stimulation of nociceptors, it is 
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also caused by damage to the nociceptors. When the body is being 
damaged, as by the heat of the candle, the pain experience that results 
from damage to nociceptors continues to instantiate TTI; its presence 
continues to causally covary with the presence of stimuli that are bad for 
us. Indeed, pain still fulfils a purpose even though it is caused by the 
damage done to the nociceptors: it can prevent more damage being 
caused by the noxious stimuli impinging on the body. However, pain 
experience caused by damage to the nociceptors continues after the body 
has been damaged, when the candle has been removed. As just noted, 
the pain caused by such bodily damage does not instantiate TTI. 
Furthermore, in paradigmatic forms of perception, when damage to 
receptors gives rise to experiences, we do not think of those experiences 
as perceptual experiences. We do not think of ‘seeing stars’ or ‘hearing a 
ringing in the ears’ as perceptual experiences because they are not 
caused by stars and a ringing noise but by some kind of damage (or 
disturbance) to the visual and auditory receptors respectively. Hence, 
when pain arises from damage to nociceptors, there is a prima facie 
reason to discount it as a veridical representation. If nociception is akin 
to a paradigmatic perceptual modality, the pain that occurs when the 
body has been damaged by the candle, which is no longer present, would 
misrepresent the presence of the extreme intensity of stimuli that are 
bad for us. 
In Cutter & Tye’s view, the pain that is caused by damage to the 
nociceptors would, presumably, represent local tissue damage as being 
bad for us. Although the representation of pain’s objects is no longer 
realized by the stimulation of nociceptors, it might be argued that the 
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assumption that the representation of pain’s objects must be so realized 
can be challenged. After all, bodily damage is rather different from the 
objects represented by paradigmatic perceptual experiences. Since 
bodily damage is not associated with particular physical or chemical 
phenomena, it might require unusual means of representation. For 
Cutter & Tye, optimal conditions are those that a representational 
system was designed to operate in by natural selection or by some 
analogous process in the course of ontogenic development. Could it be 
that the damage done to nociceptors was the mechanism selected by 
evolution by which the presence of tissue damage and its badness for us 
came to be represented?34  
It is uncontroversial that we come to know when the body has 
been damaged from the pain that we experience. And it may seem 
uncontroversial that it would be to our advantage to be able to come to 
know when the body has been damaged, so that we might be able to 
respond to the damage.35 However, there is an alternative explanation of 
how we come to know that the body has been damaged that does not 
require an experience of it. Consider how we learn about the 
paradigmatic perceptual modalities, and what has gone wrong with 
them, from the presence of anomalous experiences (e.g. ‘seeing stars’ 
and ‘hearing a ringing’) in those modalities. The damage caused to the 
perceptual mechanisms is not represented in having such experiences. It 
is inferred from the experiences. Relatedly, when pain is caused by 
damage to nociceptors, it provides a similar basis from which we can 
come to know that the body has been damaged. But the damage would 
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not be represented in having such experiences; it would be inferred from 
them. 
Perhaps an even more significant issue is whether the presence of 
the pain that occurs after a part of the body has been damaged enables 
us to respond to the bodily damage in a way that is to our advantage. 
Since the damage has already been done, there is one evident respect in 
which the pain is no longer of benefit: as protection of the body from 
damage. But it might be held that the pain experience that follows bodily 
damage serves to protect the body from further damage or acts as the 
means by which we are motivated to repair the body. 
Although there is no doubt some plausibility in this, there are also 
compelling examples for which a protective role or a reparative role for 
pain experience is hard to accept. Cancer often leads to pain, initially 
through the activation of nociceptors contiguous to the cancer, but 
subsequently by modification of and damage to the nociceptors. The 
pain caused in this way does not enable a behavioural response to the 
damage caused by the cancer. Under the conditions in which pain was 
selected, it does not enable us either to protect the body or to repair the 
body. What this shows is that bodily damage can cause pain that is 
dysfunctional rather than functional.36 There is little reason to think that 
the case of cancer is unusual in this respect. If the pain experiences 
caused when nociceptors are damaged are dysfunctional in the case of 
cancer, we have reason to think that the pain experience that occurs 
when nociceptors are damaged in other ways, such as when the skin is 
burnt, are also dysfunctional.  
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Given the problems associated with the claim that the pain 
experience caused by bodily damage instantiates TTI, 
representationalists would be advised to take seriously the proposal that 
at least some of the pain that is caused by bodily damage is not an 
adaptive response to bodily damage, but an aspect of the damage.37 
However, this cannot be the whole story. 
 
 
5. Bodily Damage and Pain 
 
Although there is reason to think that some of the pain that follows 
bodily damage is dysfunctional, there is also reason to think that much 
of the pain that follows bodily damage plays a role in the repair and 
recovery of the body from damage. It may be tempting to use this as a 
reason to seek a comprehensive explanation for pain that relates it to 
bodily damage. However, there is an explanation of the way in which the 
pain experience that follows bodily damage can contribute to the 
reparative response that fits neatly with the alternative view of the 
content of pain experience proposed here. The central idea is again that 
reparative pain experience does not represent bodily damage because 
bodily damage does not instantiate TTI. In the case of reparative pain, 
bodily damage is necessary but insufficient for pain experience. Pain is 
not caused by bodily damage; it is merely enabled by bodily damage. 
Necessary, and sufficient for pain in the circumstances, and its cause, is 
the extreme intensity of stimuli that are bad for us. It is, therefore, the 
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extreme intensity of stimuli that are also, typically, represented by 
reparative pain. 
The most prominent advocate of the view that pain experience is 
reparative is Colin Klein, who has recently claimed that the reparative 
role of pain is biologically the most essential role of pain. Indeed, he 
goes as far as to claim that ‘[p]ains that accompany recovery are the 
most prevalent, and arguably the most important, of the pains, we feel. 
[…] The pain of a single sprained ankle will last longer than the total 
duration of all the pinpricks I will feel.’38 It is reparative pain that 
motivates Klein to claim that it is not the role of pain to represent bodily 
damage but to protect the body. This, in turn, provides him with the 
basis for his view that imperatives are the way in which that protective 
role is realized. However, representationalism can account for reparative 
pain in a straightforward way on the view that pain is not the 
representation of bodily damage but the representation of the badness 
for us of the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli. Furthermore, this 
modified version of representationalism provides a plausible story of 
how reparative pain arises. 
To understand that story some background is needed. As soon as 
a part of the body is damaged a reparatory response is initiated. It 
involves: (1) changes in blood flow and permeability of blood vessels that 
allow white blood cells and proteins to circulate in the vicinity of the 
tissue damage and thereby to remove damaged tissue and to protect the 
body from infection; (2) swelling to stabilize the damaged tissue; and (3) 
sensitization of nociceptors through the binding of protein molecules to 
the nerve endings.39 
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The sensitization of nociceptors may be counted against the view 
of pain experience as a representation of bodily damage in so far as it 
tends to make it more difficult to locate the precise source of damage 
from the pain experience. But the theoretical implications of nociceptor 
sensitization go beyond that. Sensitization of nociceptors is not 
activation of nociceptors. As such, bodily damage is insufficient for 
much of the pain experience following bodily damage. Nevertheless, 
bodily damage is, at least in the present context, necessary for pain 
experience. Bodily damage enables such pain experience. No doubt we 
come to know that the body is damaged from the pain we feel in such 
circumstances. But we do not represent the damage in pain experience; 
we infer the damage from the pain we feel, which we would not normally 
feel. 
Nociceptor sensitization has the consequence that the intensity of 
stimulation, which, in normal circumstances, would not have caused the 
activation of nociceptors, is able to do so. In effect, the sensitization of 
nociceptors has the upshot of increasing the class of stimuli whose 
intensity is represented as being bad for us. And that is exactly how it 
should be. Stimuli whose intensity is not normally bad for us become 
bad for us when a part of the body is in the process of repairing itself 
from damage.40 Contrary to Klein, this suggests that reparative pain is 
not the primary role of pain but is dependent on the existing role that 
pain has to represent the presence of stimuli that are bad for us.  
Consider Klein’s example of the sprained ankle. He suggests that 
the content of the pain that accompanies the sprain is an imperative to 
protect the ankle by keeping weight off it. According to the 
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representationalist account proposed here, the pain that is caused when 
one puts weight on the ankle is an exteroceptive experience of the 
extreme intensity of stimuli that are bad for one impinging on the ankle 
when one puts weight on it. Normally such stimuli are innocuous. It is 
only when the ankle has been damaged and is in the process of repairing 
itself that they are bad for us. Only then do we need to determine their 
presence and respond to them. The negative affective character of the 
pain both determines the presence of stimuli that are now bad for us and 
motivates a response to them. The simplest response in the 
circumstances is to stop putting weight on the ankle. It may seem that 
the pain represents bodily damage because we come to know that the 
ankle is still damaged when we put weight on it. But we come to know 
this by inference; from the fact that the intensity of such stimuli does not 
normally cause us pain. 
The pain of a sprained ankle not only occurs when one puts 
weight on it. Sometimes it occurs when one just flexes the ankle. The 
pain that is caused when one flexes a sprained ankle can be explained as 
an interoceptive experience of the extreme intensity of stimuli that are 
bad for one impinging on the ankle when one flexes it. The simplest 
response to the pain so caused is to stop moving the ankle. But the 
opposite is required when someone else touches the ankle. The 
appropriate response to that is to remove the ankle from the contact. 
Any account of reparative pain should give an explanation why pain 
leads us to protect the body in the different ways in which it does. An 
account of pain as the exteroceptive or interoceptive experience of the 
intensity of stimuli that is bad for us when a part of the body is damaged 
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does just that. Indeed, it is hard to see how any other account could 
explain the specific responses that pain enables in such circumstances in 
such a straightforward way. 
There is, however, one potential objection to such an account: 
pain is sometimes continuous. Such pain experiences do not in these 
cases seem to be responses to stimuli that are bad for us and to which an 
appropriate response can be made. Continuous pain following bodily 
damage may have a number of causes. It may result from the swelling 
that serves to stabilize the injury generating continuous pressure on 
nociceptors. Or it may result from some of the proteins circulated in the 
reparatory response to bodily damage being not merely necessary but 
sufficient for nociceptor activation. However, in these two cases it is well 
established that the causes of pain have been selected because they have 
other functions related to the repair of the body. In these cases, it is 
plausible to think that the continuous pain so caused is merely a side 
effect of the body’s reparative response. After all, what would be the 
point of pain that is not responsive to any responses we could make to 
its presence?  
 
 
6. The Messenger-Shooting Objection 
 
To summarise and to add some final support to the view of pain 
proposed here, I conclude by showing how it provides a new perspective 
on and response to an objection to the representationalist account of 
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pain experience that has recently received a good deal of attention: the 
messenger-shooting objection. 41  
According to the story, a ruler orders the shooting of a messenger 
of bad tidings. Quite apart from the ruler’s moral failings, it is irrational 
for him to order the shooting of the messenger. Merely delivering a 
message does not merit such a response. What matters are the bad 
tidings the messenger carries. The messenger shooting objection to 
representationalism claims that the representationalist account of pain 
is problematic in an analogous way. According to the objection, since 
representationalism holds that pain experience is the representation of 
bodily damage and its badness for us, what matters to us should be the 
contents of the message that pain carries; the pain experience merely 
delivers the message. When we respond to pain by seeking to eliminate 
the pain, rather than address the bodily damage that is bad for us, as we 
often do, we would thereby be responding irrationally. Yet, so the 
objection goes, we are clearly not responding irrationally to the pain we 
feel by seeking to eliminate it. Hence there is something wrong with the 
representationalist account. The analogy is supposed to draw attention 
to the failure of the representationalist account to explain (satisfactorily) 
what it is about the representation of what is bad that explains why pain 
feels bad and motivates action. According to the version of 
representationalism developed here, the objection draws attention to 
something else. 
Cutter and Tye, in their reply to Jacobson’s version of the 
messenger shooting objection, note that there is a reason for responding 
to pain even without responding to its contents that challenges the 
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analogy: pain can be instrumentally bad for us. That is right but not in a 
way that removes the problems for Cutter and Tye’s representationalist 
account. For, if it is rational to seek to eliminate pain without 
eliminating the bodily damage that it is supposed to be the function of 
pain to represent, it is now open to question whether this is in fact the 
function of pain.  
The view developed in this paper chimes with the supposed 
concerns raised by the messenger shooting analogy (that there is more 
to the explanation of the negative affective character of pain and its 
motivational force than reference to the representation of bodily 
damage) and at the same time addresses the further issues raised by the 
objection. In §2 reasons were given to think that the content of pain 
experiences is typically the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli and its 
badness for us. In §3 reasons were then given to think that something 
more than the representation of the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli 
as bad for us is required to explain the negative affective character of 
pain. What is required is a mode of presentation of such content. But 
this would only be enough to explain why pain has its distinctive 
negative affective character in conjunction with another function that 
pain serves: to motivate the removal of the noxious stimuli that typically 
pain represents. On the representationalist approach recommended 
here, there is an explanation for why the representation of what is bad 
for us should feel bad to us.42 
A further upshot of the present approach is that it provides a 
better reason to think that the messenger shooting analogy is 
inappropriate. As discussed in §4, if the proper function of pain is to 
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represent the extreme intensity of noxious stimuli, then the situation 
arises in which it is plausible to think that at least some of the pain that 
follows bodily damage is better explained as an aspect of the bodily 
damage rather than a response to bodily damage. In short, it is because 
pain feels bad to us that we have a reason to eliminate it, but it is 
because pain feeling bad to us can be dysfunctional for us that we have a 
reason to eliminate it by medical intervention.  
Significantly, none of the reasons given for eliminating pain 
without addressing its contents are appropriate when, under normal 
circumstances, pain experience represents the extreme intensity of 
noxious stimuli. Indeed, we would not, or should not, seek to eliminate 
pain without addressing its contents in those circumstances. After all, it 
is the pain experience that makes possible the determination of the 
presence of stimuli that are bad for us, and also provides the motivation 
to get rid of them by motivating us to get rid of the pain. If we got rid of 
the pain experience by medical interventions, our bodies would be open 
to all sorts of dangers.43 The messenger shooting objection to 
representationalism does not provide an objection to 
representationalism as formulated in this paper. It rather seeks to 
provide an objection to a representationalist approach to pain that this 
paper has argued should be rejected on other grounds.44  
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1 For discussion of the negative affective character of pain see Cutter & Tye, 2011; for 
discussion of the motivational nature of pain see Cutter & Tye, 2014. See also Bain, 
2013 and forthcoming. 
2 Cutter & Tye, 2011, p.91. 
3 I adopt the terminology of a ‘valuational property’ from Cutter & Tye to refer to the 
property that is attributed in experience when something is represented as bad for us.  
4 Representationalism about pain experience faces other challenges. For instance, 
imperativists (see Klein, 2015) argue that the motivational capacity of pain is better 
explained by imperatival content than representational content. A further aim of the 
present paper is to address the kind of objections to representationalism that can lead 
to such a view. 
5 Cutter & Tye, 2011, p. 91. 
6 Cutter & Tye, 2011, p. 92. Somewhat more specifically, it is caused by damage or 
disturbance ‘of a certain shape, volume and intensity, as well as a certain quality 
(whether it is caused thermally, mechanically or chemically).’ 
7 Cutter & Tye 2011, p. 92. In construing pain experience as a type of perceptual 
experience they follow a longstanding tradition according to which pain experience is a 
form of interoception that determines when a part of one’s body is in a bad state, not a 
form of exteroception that determines the presence of objects outside the body in the 
way that the paradigmatic exteroceptive modalities of vision, audition, olfaction, 
gustation and touch do. The perceptual approach has been developed in a variety of 
ways in line with the variety of approaches to perception more generally.  See Pitcher, 
1970 and Newton, 1989, for two contrary such approaches. 
8 Cutter & Tye 2011, pp. 99-100. 
9 Strictly speaking, experiences represent things, like damage or disturbance, by 
representing their properties. The present point applies at the level of properties. 
Damage and disturbance are, presumably, differentiated by their properties. Hence 
they are not quite sure exactly which properties are tracked by pain experience. 
10 Tye, 1995, p. 194. 
11 See Perl & Kruger, 1996, for a review of recent research and Lynn & Perl, 1996, for 
experimental details.  A variety of types of nociceptor have been distinguished that are 
individuated by the range of energy types to which they are sensitive. This is not to 
ignore the challenge to specificity theories of pain raised by Melzack & Wall, 1982. 
Nothing in their challenge undermines the claim that nociceptors play an essential role 
in the detection of noxious stimuli. 
12 Pain experiences can be caused in the absence of such stimuli. That can be explained 
by the absence of optimal conditions. However, sometimes such stimuli are insufficient 
for pain experience. This is a key element in the attack on specificity theories of pain by 
Melzack & Wall. However, these situations are also unusual and so would be a 
contentious way to reject the representationalist approach, as, for instance, Klein, 
2015, seeks to do. Indeed, the evolution of a gating system posited by Melzack & Wall is 
consistent with the representationalist position proposed here according to which non-
optimal circumstances arise when nociceptors are damaged. 
13 Grice, 1962.  
14 See Gray, 2014, for a defence of the intensive theory of pain. Although this 
exteroceptive view of pain experience is uncommon in philosophy, it is not uncommon 
in psychology. 
15 Exactly how heat perception is to be understood has received remarkably little 
detailed attention and is often misconstrued. See Gray, 2013, for some of the 
complexities involved and an argument that heat perception determines the energy 
transmitted to (heat sensations) and away from (cold sensations) the body. Once it is 
accepted that heat sensations represent the energy transferred to the body, it is not a 
large leap to appreciate how pain sensations could represent the extreme intensity of 
stimuli impinging on the body. 
16 The variety of types of pain experiences may be explained, at least in part, by 
reference to the variety of perceptual experiences by which they are accompanied.   
17 See Lynn & Perl, 1996, for studies determining the receptivity of nociceptors.  
18 Klein, 2015, chap. 3, claims that pain is homeostatic, i.e. it enables the body to 
recover to a stable state. A problem with this claim is that pain can allow us to address 
noxious stimuli without any relevant change to the body having taken place. 
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19 See Klein, 2015, pp. 29-31 who, citing P. D. Wall, claims that such considerations 
should persuade us to reject a representationalist approach.  
20 For instance, consider the importance of being able to detect insect bites and stings. 
21 As a referee points out, I do not directly address cases of pain, such as stomach aches 
and headaches, which seem to require a somewhat different explanation. I do not claim 
the general approach proposed here to apply without exception. Nevertheless, I suspect 
some cases of stomach aches and headaches could be informed by this approach. 
22 Klein, 2015, p. 1-3. 
23 This does not exhaust the types of pain that we can experience. Nevertheless, it 
includes many instances of pain. And those pain experiences that do not seem to fit 
easily here do not show that the explanation is not adequate to many cases of pain 
experience. 
24 See Bain, 2014, for instance. 
25 See Klein, 2015, chap.11, for a view of asymbolia that challenges the distinction 
between sensory and affective components.  
26 A referee for this journal pressed me for my account of how the specific content of 
experience of extremely intense stimuli is supposed to feature in the character of pain 
experience of it. I am grateful to them for making me think about this further. 
27 That is why pain experiences have been selected.  
28 The case for phenomenal modes of presentation has been made perhaps most 
prominently by Chalmers, 2004, who draws a parallel between Fregean senses in the 
philosophy of language and phenomenal modes of presentation in the philosophy of 
perception. It is this that I have in mind here. See also Kriegel, 2013.  
29 Bain, 2013. 
30 See the discussion in Jacobson, 2013, section four. In the philosophy of perception, 
experience is transparent if, metaphorically speaking, one sees through an experience 
to its object. This is the notion of transparency that I have in mind here when I claim 
that pain experience lacks it. For reasons to think pain is not a transparent experience 
see Aydede, 2009. 
31 Aydede, 2009, objects that representationalist accounts of pain do not explain the 
way in which the experience of pain is more akin to introspection than interoception. I 
am sympathetic to the objection. A non-reductive version of representationalism of the 
sort proposed here that recognizes the multiplicity of functions of pain seems to me 
better equipped to address the challenge.  
32 Other approaches, such as imperativism and desire theoretic accounts do the same, 
mutatis mutandis.  
33 In so far as the negative affective character of pain can be explained by the function 
pain has, it is only an explanation of pain at the personal level. There are no doubt 
various functional processes that underlie the presence of pain experience at the sub-
personal level. It is a further substantive issue how the personal level and sub-personal 
level functions of pain are related.  
34 This might also focus attention on what the general object of representation of pain 
experience could be.  
35 Klein, 2015, argues powerfully that evolutionary pressures are not best met by the 
representation of tissue damage.  
36 That some pain is dysfunctional provides one reason for the evolution of a gating 
system.  
37 The pain following damage to nociceptors is not only a challenge to 
representationalist accounts of pain; it is a challenge to any account of pain. For 
instance, an imperativist account might claim that the pain following damage to 
nociceptors can be explained as an imperative to protect the body. That there is 
nothing that the individual can do to protect the body from cancer suggests that pain is 
not best understood as such a command. I take it that pains so caused are more 
plausibly construed as dysfunctional. 
38 Klein, 2015, p. 4. 
39 For more details see Melzack & Wall, 1982, chap.5.   
40 If stimuli that are not normally extremely intense become sufficiently intense to be 
bad for us, and thus to be represented as bad for us, the question arises of whether 
their extreme intensity is or could be represented in distinctness from their badness for 
us, which would bear on the discussion at the start of §3.     
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41 See Jacobson, 2013, for a statement and discussion of the problem. 
42 A referee for this journal points out that an advocate of the messenger shooting 
objection to representationalism might not be satisfied with this response. They might 
reply that no explanation has been given for why the role played by pain could not have 
been played by an experience that lacked the negative affective character of pain. In 
response, one could reject the putative possibility either as inconceivable or, if 
conceivable, as impossible. The ground here is well trodden in other contexts. 
43 This is exactly what happens in cases of congenital analgesia. 
44 Thanks to audiences at the University of Glasgow, the University of Southampton 
and Cardiff University for feedback on earlier versions of this material. Thanks 
especially to David Bain and Jennifer Corns for extended discussions on the nature of 
pain. Thanks to the anonymous referees for this journal for their advice on the 
penultimate draft.  
 37 
REFERENCES 
 
Aydede, M. (2009). ‘Is pain the perception of something?’ Journal of 
Philosophy 106, pp. 531-567. 
Bain, D. (2013). ‘What makes pains unpleasant?’ Philosophical Studies 
116, pp. 69-89. 
Bain, D. (2014). ‘Pains that don’t hurt’, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 92 (2), pp. 305-320. 
Bain, D. (forthcoming). ‘Why take painkillers?’, Noûs 
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12228. 
Chalmers, D. (2004). ‘The representational character of experience,’ in 
B. Leiter (ed.) The Future for Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cutter, B. & Tye, M. (2011). ‘Tracking representationalism and the 
painfulness of pain,’ Philosophical Issues 21, pp. 90-109. 
Cutter, B. & Tye, M. (2014). ‘Pain and reasons: Why it is rational to kill 
the messenger,’ The Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256), pp. 423-433. 
Gray, R. (2013). ‘What do our sensation of heat and cold represent?’ 
Philosophical Studies 166 (S1), pp. 131-151. 
Gray, R. (2014). ‘Pain, perception and the sensory modalities: Revisiting 
the intensive theory,’ Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1), pp. 
87-101.  
Grice, H. P. (1962). ‘Some remarks about the senses,’ in Analytical 
Philosophy, Series 1, R. J. Butler (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. 
 38 
Jacobson, H. (2013). ‘Killing the messenger: Representationalism and 
the painfulness of pain,’ The Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252), pp. 509-
519. 
Klein, C. (2015). What the Body Commands. Cambridge 
(Massachusetts): Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 
Lynn, B. & E. R. Perl. (1996). ‘Afferent mechanisms of pain,’ in L. 
Kruger, M. Friedman & E. Carterette, (eds) Pain and Touch. Cambridge 
(Massachusetts): Academic Press, pp. 213-241. 
Kriegel, U. (2013). ‘The phenomenal intentionality research 
programme,’ in U. Kriegel (ed.) Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Perl, E. R. & Kruger, L. (1996). ‘Nociception and pain: Evolution of 
concepts and observations,’ in L. Kruger, M. Friedman & E. Carterette, 
(eds) Pain and Touch. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Academic Press, pp. 
179-211. 
Pitcher, G. 1970. ‘Pain perception,’ Philosophical Review 79, pp. 368-
393. 
Melzack, R. & Wall, P. (1982). The Challenge of Pain, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books. 
Newton, N. (1989). ‘On viewing pain as a secondary quality,’ Noûs 23, 
pp. 569-598. 
Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge 
(Massachusetts): Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 
